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HUMAN DIGNITY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY IN
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES AS EXAMINED




The American Declaration of Independence declares, "[wie hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are ... endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men... ."' From 1776 forward,
America has remained committed to individual liberty as its core
constitutional value.2 Across the Atlantic, Germany has chosen
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1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); EDWARD J. EBERLE,
DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES
42 (2002) [hereinafter DIGNITY AND LIBERTY].
2. See U.S. National Archives & Record Administration, National Archives
Experience: The Charters of Freedom, at http://www.archives.gov/national-
archives-experience/declaration.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004) (declaring that "the
Declaration of Independence is at once the nation's most cherished symbol of liberty
and Jefferson's most enduring monument.").
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human dignity, rather than individual liberty, as the essence of its
social order.3
The guarantees of liberty in the United States and human dignity
in Germany find their roots in each country's constitution. The
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution declares,
"[o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law...."4  The German Basic Law or
Grundgesetz (federal constitution), meanwhile, emphasizes the
importance of human dignity in Article 1(1), which states, "[h]uman
dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty
of all state authority."5
These two clauses do the heavy lifting in the difficult
constitutional cases that have come before the two high courts.
Justice Wolfgang Zeidler, former president of the Federal
Constitutional Court, states, "[wihoever controls the [meaning of the]
order of values, controls the Constitution."6 With strong powers of
judicial review, the Supreme Court of the United States and
Germany's Federal Constitutional Court have a great deal of control
over the meaning of their respective constitutions, and individual
liberty in America and human dignity in Germany are their primary
interpretative tools.
This paper compares the German emphasis on human dignity
with the American emphasis on liberty through the lenses of each
country's leading abortion cases. Abortion is particularly appropriate
for this comparison because the abortion debate boils down to a moral
dilemma between preserving the sanctity of life on the one hand and
the freedom of choice on the other.8
3. DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 42. As Professor Donald Kommers has
noted, we can speak of a German constitution of dignity as compared to an American
constitution of liberty. Id. at 7. "[Hluman dignity is at the top of the Basic Law's
value order. It is the formative principle in terms of which all other constitutional
values are defined and explained. It occupies the position that liberty may be said to
play in the American constitutional order." DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 359 (2d ed.
1997) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE].
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1(1) (F.R.G.).
6. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 313 (alteration in original).
7. DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at xii.
8. Id. at 162. Edward Eberle posits, "[h]ow to accommodate the proper decisional
sovereignty of women with the competing rights of developing life ... is the central
matter of the abortion cases." Id. at 165.
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Furthermore, a comparison of Germany and the United States is
beneficial for several reasons. First, these two countries are among
the world's strongest constitutional democracies, both in terms of
legal influence and economic power, and both are liberal democracies
committed to liberty and personal dignity.9  As such, their
constitutions have greatly influenced the process of constitution
making around the world. Second, their highest courts are among the
world's most powerful courts of constitutional review, and other
national courts frequently cite to the decisions of these two high
courts. 0 Lastly, both countries have had several decades to strike a
balance between some of the underlying tensions within their legal
systems, constantly applying human dignity and individual liberty to
new legal situations throughout this process.
Both nations recognize and respect both individual liberty and
human dignity." However, Germany has opted for a balance favoring
human dignity over individual liberty, whereas the opposite can be
said of America. This tension between human dignity and individual
liberty is seen in each country's abortion jurisprudence, as each court
9. Id. at 4. As of 2002, the United States economy was the largest in the world,
while Germany's economy was the fourth largest, behind the United States, Japan,
and China. Id.
10. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at xii-iv.
11. In America, former Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, Jr. argued that
American courts should provide a greater respect for human dignity. For example,
with respect to the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment,
Brennan argued that the "fundamental premise" of the clause is "that even the most
base criminal remains a human being possessed of some potential, at least, for
human dignity." Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan, "Human Dignity," and
Constitutional Interpretation, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND
AMERICAN VALUES 129, 130 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992)
[hereinafter AMERICAN VALUES] (construing Justice William J. Brennan, Address to
the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985)), in THE
GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 24 (Federalist Soc'y 1986);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972)). This argument is very similar to ones
advanced by the German Constitutional Court in the Life Imprisonment Case. In
that case, the Court held that human dignity mandates that the state cannot keep a
person in prison for life as a matter of course; rather, the state must consider the
particular situation of each prisoner including his capacity for rehabilitation and
resocialization. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 311. The Court
stated, "[riespect for human dignity especially requires the prohibition of cruel,
inhuman, and degrading punishments. [The state] cannot turn the offender into an
object of crime prevention to the detriment of his constitutionally protected right to
social worth and respect." Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 45, 187 (F.R.G.), reprinted in
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 308 (alteration in original).
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struggles to find the necessary balance between a woman's liberty
interest in deciding whether to have an abortion and the need to
protect the life and resulting human dignity of the fetus. Thus, the
German and the United States abortion decisions can be pictured as
falling somewhere along a continuum, similar to the political
continuum, with an absolute guarantee of individual liberty on the
left and an absolute respect for human dignity on the right.
Part II of this paper details the origins and importance of both
human dignity and individual liberty in Germany. Part III considers
America's relative lack of emphasis on human dignity and its clear
emphasis on individual liberty. Parts IV and V set forth the rulings
and the analysis of each country's two leading abortion cases."
Critically comparing the two high courts' reliance upon human
dignity and individual liberty in their abortion decisions, Part VI
analyzes the constitutional bases of these two rights, and considers
the courts' treatment and characterization of the competing interests
at stake in the abortion debate. Finally, the conclusion addresses
whether and to what extent a synthesis of Germany's human dignity
approach and America's individual liberty approach is possible.
II. HUMAN DIGNITY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY IN GERMANY
A. Human Dignity in Germany
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany follows a
pattern similar to the United States Constitution and the
constitutions of other liberal democracies. It guarantees individual
rights that the state must respect, creates a political system of
separate and divided powers, creates an independent judiciary with
the power to review legislative acts, and "establishes the Constitution
as the supreme law of the land."13
Article 1(1) of the Basic Law declares, "[hiuman dignity shall be
inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state
authority."14 The wording of Article 1(1) is significant, as it reflects
12. The Supreme Court of the United States decided Roe v. Wade in 1973; the
Constitutional Court decided Abortion I in 1975. In the 1990s, both Courts
fundamentally rethought both decisions. In 1992, the Supreme Court decided
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, and in 1993, the Constitutional Court
handed down Abortion 11.
13. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 31.
14. GG art. 1(1).
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the notion that human dignity, like all other fundamental rights, is
anterior to the state and belongs to persons as persons. 5 In addition,
human dignity is the highest value in German jurisprudence and the
duty of the state to protect an individual's human dignity generally
outweighs other constitutional rights. In the Microcensus Case,16 the
Constitutional Court stated:
Human dignity is at the very top of the value order of the Basic
Law. This commitment to the dignity of man dominates the spirit
of Article 2([1]), as it does all other provisions of the Basic Law.
The state may take no measure, not even by law, that violates the
dignity of the person beyond the limits specified by Article
2([1]).... [which] guarantees to each citizen an inviolable sphere of
privacy beyond the reach of public authority.1
7
Another key feature of human dignity in Germany is that a
person's human dignity may never be lost, and it therefore may not be
ignored by the state in order to further other interests. This is
demonstrated by the Mephisto case. ' In Mephisto, the Constitutional
Court balanced the freedom of speech and artistic liberty in
publishing a book against the Basic Law's protection of human dignity
implicated because the book at issue dishonored the name and
memory of the complainant's deceased father. The Court stated:
It would be incompatible with the constitutional commandment
that human dignity is inviolate.., if a person, possessed of human
dignity by virtue of his personhood, could be degraded or
debased ... even after his death. Accordingly, the obligation that
Article 1([1]) imposes on all state authority to afford the
individual protection from attacks on his dignity does not end with
death...."
15. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 301. The first draft of Article 1
read, "[tihe dignity of man is founded upon eternal rights with which every person is
endowed by nature." However, political compromise resulted in the philosophically
and religiously neutral formulation that we see in Article 1, "[t]he dignity of man is
inviolable." Id. at 300-01.
16. BVerfGE 27, 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at
299.
17. Id.
18. BVerfGE 30, 173, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at
301.
19. Id. at 302-03.
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Thus, in Germany, human dignity is permanent and unchanging.0
Significantly, the fact that the person defamed was dead at the time
of the defamation indicates that the German conception of the
principle of human dignity is broader than the conception of liberty in
the United States.21
Both the Constitutional Court and German commentators have
identified three theoretical bases of human dignity, all three of which
are manifested in the text of the Basic Law as a whole: social
democratic thought, Christian natural law, and Kantian ethics.2' But
perhaps the single most important factor leading to the placement of
human dignity at the top of all constitutional values in Germany is
the failure of the Weimar Republic. 23 At the time the Basic Law was
drafted in 1949,24 the fresh memory of the Holocaust directly impacted
the framers of Germany's new legal order. Relying on natural law,
the drafters of the Basic Law thus declared that certain objectively
ordered principles rooted in justice and equality were "not to be
sacrificed for the exigencies of the day, as had been the case during
the Nazi era."25 As Professor Bernhard Schlink observed, "rather than
being shattered by the Third Reich, the German belief in law over
politics motivated a return to law as it originally and naturally was -
a legal renaissance as a natural law renaissance. "26 Out of this design
20. The German Federal Constitutional Court would likely agree with Alan
Gewirth's statement that
if inherent human dignity... must belong to all humans equally,
then it must be a characteristic of criminals as well as saints, of
cowards as well as heroes, of fools as well as sages, of mental
defectives as well as mentally normal persons, of slaves as well as
masters, of subjects as well as lords, .... of drug addicts as well as
persons of self-control ....
Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in AMERICAN VALUES, supra
note 11, at 15.
21. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 305.
22. Id. at 304.
23. DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 18.
24. The Basic Law, Germany's federal Constitution (the Grundgesetz), was entered
into force on May 23, 1949. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 30. On
October 3, 1990, when Germany was reunified, the Basic Law was retained as an all-
German constitution. Id.
25. DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 7.
26. Id. at 18 (quoting Bernhard Schlink, German Constitutional Culture in
Transition, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 711, 724 (1993)).
496 [Vol. 11:2
2004] HUMAN DIGNITY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
arose the concept of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment -
a concept strangely foreign to Americans.27
The drafters of the 1949 Basic Law drew heavily from the ideas of
Immanuel Kant, who argued that one should never treat humans as
objects of manipulation, but always as ends.28  Kant explicitly
grounded this mandate in terms of human dignity, stating that "man
regarded as a person.. . possesses ... a dignity (an absolute inner
worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational
beings in the world."29 The Court extended this philosophy to the
state, declaring that "[tihe state violates human dignity when it treats
persons as mere objects."'
The Constitutional Court's Polygraph Case reveals this Kantian
influence. In that case, the Constitutional Court invalidated the use
of a polygraph by law enforcement on the basis of human dignity. In
Kantian fashion, the court reasoned that "[tlo elicit the truth by
attaching a person to a machine ... is to regard him as an object, and
not as a human being capable of telling the truth through ordinary
questioning."3'1
Finally, a significant difference between Germany and America
that greatly influences the two country's abortion cases is that, unlike
the United States, Germany is a social welfare state. As a social
27. Even political parties that seek to abolish the free democratic order may be
declared unconstitutional under Article 21(2). In his recent book, Edward Eberle
explains that a "distinguishing trait of modern Germany is the concept of a 'militant
democracy' (streitbare Demokratie), which obligates the state to resist any threats to
the basic democratic order...." This concept is a direct response to the dramatic
failure of the Weimer republic. As the German Constitutional Court has stated,
"[elnemies of the Constitution must not be allowed to endanger, impair, or destroy the
existence of the state while claiming protection of rights granted by the Basic Law."
DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 20-21 (quoting BVerfGE 30, 1 (19-20),
reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 228).
28. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 301. Kant declared that each
man "is obligated to acknowledge, in a practical way, the dignity of humanity in every
other man" and in turn that "[e]very man has a rightful claim to respect from his
fellow-men." IMMANUEL KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE: PART II OF THE METAPHYSIC
OF MORALS 461 (1971).
29. Gewirth, supra note 20, at 17.
30. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 299.
31. Id. at 305; see also BVerfGE 45, 187, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 306 (declaring that "[r]espect for human dignity
especially requires the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishments.
[The state] cannot turn the offender into an object of crime prevention to the
detriment of his constitutionally protected right to social worth and respect"). Id. at
308.
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state, Germany aims at affirmatively removing any social and
economic inequalities through direct and proactive state
interference. The German emphasis on state involvement is built
into the Basic Law, which establishes human dignity as both an
objective and subjective right. Human dignity is objective, or positive,
in the sense that it mandates an affirmative obligation on the state to
establish conditions necessary for the realization of dignity. 3 The
concept is subjective, or negative, in the sense that it bars the state
from direct interference with individual freedoms.3 ' This is in stark
contrast to the American Constitution, which is designed to limit
government and maximize individual liberty.35 Thus, as a liberal or
individualistic state (rather than a social welfare state), the primary
concern in America is with the protection of certain individual rights
and freedoms through non-interference by the state.
B. Individual Liberty in Germany
The German Constitutional Court almost always reads the
human dignity clause "in tandem with the general liberty interests
secured by the personality,6 inviolability [individual freedom], and
right-to-life clauses37 of Article 2" of the Basic Law.38 This reflects the
structure of the Basic Law whereby the Article 1 and Article 2
provisions are designed to reinforce each other.
As a component of liberty, a general right to privacy is also
recognized in Germany, although its importance is much less
significant than in the United States. As in America, the German
Constitution does not explicitly grant a right of privacy. Three
32. See generally MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN COMMON LAW
PERSPECTIVE (1985).
33. See Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany:
Should Americans Pay Attention?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (1993).
34. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 312.
35. DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 26. Edward Eberle notes, "Americans are
by nature skeptical about the existence and use of government power. Thus, it seems
appropriate that the American conception of rights lacks any claim to government
action." Id.
36. GG art. 2(1). Article 2(1) states, "[e]very person shall have the right to free
development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or
offend against the constitutional order or the moral law." Id.
37. GG art. 2(2). Article 2(2) states, "[elvery person shall have the right to life and
physical integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These rights may be
interfered with only pursuant to a law." Id.
38. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 298.
39. Id.
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provisions, however, protect privacy interests. Most significantly, the
personality clause of Article 2(1) declares that "every person shall
have the right to free development of his personality," but only
"insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against
the constitutional order or the moral law.
' 0
The Microcensus Case4 best demonstrates how the Constitutional
Court applies the personality clause in conjunction with human
dignity. In the Microcensus Case, the Constitutional Court held that
the state "may not treat a person as an object subject to an inventory
of any kind. The state ... must leave the individual with an inner
space for the purpose of the free and responsible development of his
personality. Within this space the individual is his own master.
The Court reasoned that by treating the person as a mere object in
violation of the personality clause, the state violates human dignity.43
Thus, the Microcensus Case reveals that individual liberty in
Germany is but one component of the overarching principle of respect
for human dignity.
Through various cases, both the Federal Constitutional Court
and the Federal High Court of Justice have delineated a private
sphere of inviolability that the state may not penetrate. Pursuant to
these decisions, the "general right to personality" includes "the right
to a private, secret, intimate sphere of life," the right "to personal
honor and the rightful portrayal of one's own person," and the limited
"right not to have statements falsely attributed to oneself."44
However, as the German abortion cases reveal, these rights are
most often vindicated through the human dignity clause of the
German Constitution, rather than through the right to individual
40. GG art. 2(1). The other two provisions are the Article 10 provision guaranteeing
"[tihe privacy.., of posts and telecommunications," and Article 13's guarantee of the
home's inviolability. GG. Art. 10(1) & 13(1).
41. BVerfGE 27, 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at
299-300.
42. Id. at 299. The Court stated, "[tihe state invades this realm when.., it takes an
action - however value neutral - that tends to inhibit the free development of
personality because of the psychological pressure of general public compliance." Id. at
299-300.
43. Id. Note also how this statement reflects Kantian ethics.
44. Id. at 321. According to decisions from both the Federal Constitutional Court
and the Federal High Court of Justice, the general right to personality includes the
right to a private, secret, intimate sphere of life; the right to personal honor and the
rightful portrayal of one's own person; and the limited right not to have statements
falsely attributed to oneself. BVerfGE 54, 148, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 321.
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liberty, as in America. This dichotomy is largely due to the fact that
the right to personality is dispositive only where a governmental
action invades a liberty interest vital to the exercise of personality
while not implicating some other positive right.45 But more basically,
this results from the fact that, in Germany, arguments grounded in a
respect for human dignity carry greater force and legitimacy than
those based on individual liberty, a position that arguably contrasts
with current American jurisprudence.
III. HUMAN DIGNITY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY IN AMERICA
A. Human Dignity in America
The term dignity actually appears quite often in American legal
and political rhetoric. The United States Supreme Court has cited
human dignity in various contexts, including cases implicating the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.46
Martha Minow points to limits on free speech, rules regarding
confrontation of witnesses in criminal prosecutions, trial by jury, and
protection against cruel and unusual punishment, as "mark[ing] a
constitutional sensitivity to degradation either committed or tolerated
by the state."4'7 While this argument carries some weight, the degree
and concreteness of legal protection that American courts have
afforded human dignity in these and other situations is much less
significant than in Germany.
45. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 313-14.
46. AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 11, at 3 (citing Jordan Paust, Human Dignity as a
Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27
How. L.J. 150, 150-58 (1984)). See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2000,
2005 (2003) (noting the Ninth Circuit's view that "the Fifth Amendment's purpose is
to prevent coercive interrogation practices that are destructive of human dignity;"
also noting that "[clonvictions based on evidence obtained by methods that are 'so
brutal and so offensive to human dignity' that they 'shock the conscience' violate the
Due Process Clause"); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 n.6 (2002) (reiterating
the Fifth Circuit's holding that handcuffing inmates to fences and cells for long
periods of time "run[s] afoul of the Eighth Amendment, offend[s] contemporary
concepts of decency, human dignity, and precepts of civilization which we profess to
possess.") Id.
47. Martha Minow, Equality and the Bill of Rights, in AMERICAN VALUES, supra note
11, at 125. The "degradation" refers to the degradation of human dignity.
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The concept of human dignity in America grew out of very
different circumstances than in Germany. At the end of the
eighteenth century, the dominant American notion of human dignity
was that it belonged only to men of rank. In this sense, the term
"dignity" is consequent upon the having of certain rights; it is not the
basis of rights.48  Thomas Paine directly challenged this notion of
dignity. Paine asserted the idea of the "natural dignity of man" as a
status that all people enjoy, not just men of rank.49  Paine's
characterization spilled over into the American Enlightenment.
While some Founding Fathers, like James Madison, still spoke of
dignity in terms of social status, others like Alexander Hamilton and
Thomas Jefferson advanced Paine's conception of human dignity as
belonging to all men.50 In addition, the American Declaration of
Independence aspired to create a social order where "all [men are
created equal."" Yet, early America did not fully adopt this
conception of human dignity, as women, African-Americans, and other
minorities were not afforded the same legal recognition of human
dignity as white landowners.
Since the nation's founding, human dignity has certainly played a
role in American jurisprudence, but its role has been much less direct
and less significant than in Germany. There are several indicators
that human dignity does not carry significant weight in American
jurisprudence. First, unlike the German Basic Law, the United
States Constitution does not make an explicit commitment to respect
the dignity of man.52 Further, although the United States Supreme
Court has often cited to human dignity, the Court has never clarified
its precise meaning.53  In addition, in a majority of United States
Supreme Court cases citing human dignity, the Court uses it without
explanation or citation to other cases.54 Finally, the Supreme Court
rarely, if ever, explicitly bases its decision on human dignity. This is
in stark contrast to the use of human dignity by Germany's Federal
48. Gewirth, supra note 20, at 12.
49. AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 11, at 4-5 (citing THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF
MAN 329-30 (1973)).
50. See id. at 5-6.
51. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
52. Id. at para. 2-3.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S.
666, 713 (1998); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 852 (1994); Campbell v. Wood, 511
U.S. 1119 (1994).
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Constitutional Court, where human dignity is often dispositive of the
legal issue.5
This differing treatment of human dignity in Supreme Court
cases is partly due to the fact that unlike in Germany, the legal
protection of human dignity in America was eventually swallowed up
by the notion of equality, which is clearly expressed in the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868
shortly after the Civil War. The explicit guarantee of the "equal
protection of the laws" 6 was a significant step toward legal
recognition of human dignity to all, but significantly this protection
came in the language of "equal protection" - not as an explicit
recognition of the "human dignity" of all American citizens. Because
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to secure equal
treatment for ex-slaves, 57 the Amendment clearly could have been
phrased in terms of human dignity rather than equality. The result is
that today, cast in terms of both equality before the law and
embedded in the general concept of substantive due process, the
notion of human dignity in America is narrower and has less direct
legal force than in Germany.
B. Individual Liberty in America
Securing civil liberties, not protecting human dignity, was the
central formative principle of the American Constitution. 8 Americans
today still believe in and protect individual liberty perhaps more than
any other value. The recent backlash against the USA Patriot Act, for
55. See, e.g, BVerfGE 27, 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
3, at 299; BVerfGE 45, 187, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
3, at 306.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
57. GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 676 (10th ed.
1980).
58. David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Liberty, Dignity, and Reasonable
Justification, in AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 11, at 75. "The American idea of
constitutionalism rests on a normative political theory of equal inalienable rights and
a constitutional theory of the constraints on political power required for those rights
to be respected." Id.
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example, is a strong reminder of the American public's continuing
concern with securing civil liberties against government intrusion.59
The Framers of the United States Constitution reacted to the
oppressive English government in a strikingly parallel manner to the
way in which the drafters of the German Basic Law responded to the
Nazi experience. In America, the experiences of the colonists created
a fear of concentrated governmental power. This fear was a
significant catalyst in the development of the Constitution's
separation of powers. 60 The Framers were also heavily influenced by
John Locke's theory "that men formed society primarily to secure
their natural rights of life, liberty, and property."6' In some respects,
Locke's views parallel the essential message of Christianity, which
62
recognizes the liberty and equality of all human beings. As David
A.J. Richards notes, "Americans, following Locke, thus gave
prominence to the right to conscience" based in part on the view that
conscience and religious freedom must be protected from state
coercion and control. 63  Thus, early Americans primarily revolted
against the English oppression of freedom, whereas mid-twentieth
century Germans reacted against a gross violation of human dignity.
Certainly, notions of equality and liberty are intimately linked to
human dignity. During her struggles to gain equality for women
during the nineteenth century, for example, Elizabeth Cady Stanton
highlighted the connection between equality and human dignity,
noting that equality goes hand in hand with acknowledging the
freedom and dignity of every individual. 4 But the argument that
universal human dignity was the driving force behind the American
emphasis on individual liberty can only go so far. This argument
would imply that all individual citizens should enjoy equal public
59. See, e.g., Elizabeth Barker Brandt & Jack Van Valkenburgh, The USA Patriot
Act: The Devil is in the Details, 46 AnVOC. 24, 24 (2003) (noting that "the Act
authorizes serious violations of civil liberties"). Id.
60. See Richards, supra note 58, at 93; see, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible
Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 901 (1990) (noting that "[iun The Federalist
Number 53, [James] Madison expressed horror at the power of the English
Parliament to undo its own democratic bona fides by changing the 'most fundamental
provisions' of government, such as the requisite frequency of elections"). Id.
61. DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 16.
62. Richards, supra note 58, at 80.
63. Id. As David A.J. Richards notes, "[tihe specific argument for toleration was that
a legitimate state could have no power to enforce sectarian conscience because such
power was corruptively biased in ways that cannot impartially enforce the right to
conscience." Id.
64. Minow, supra note 47, at 128.
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standing, but that was clearly not the case in early America. While
Thomas Jefferson and others believed human dignity to be
independent of arbitrary distinctions based on "birth or badge," early
American society still retained other degrading distinctions based on
race, gender, religion, and property, revealing that human dignity
65
was not the true focal point of the early American legal structure.
Unlike Germany, America still has not adopted Kant's views in
their fullest sense. For example, Kant's belief that humans should
never be treated as means implies that an individual should not be
subjected to overly harsh imprisonment in order to maximize overall
freedom in society. Yet, the United States Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized that "[i]solation of the dangerous [is] ... an
important function of the criminal law."66 Thus, the American view of
punishment is grounded in part on the concern of securing the liberty
of all Americans by isolating the most dangerous individuals, rather
than the concern for blind respect of every individual's dignity. This
is just one of several examples of America's decision to value liberty
above human dignity.
The American rejection of human dignity as a core constitutional
value requiring affirmative protection holds true in today's federal
judiciary. In 1990, Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals argued, "[wlhen we observe that the Constitution...
stands for 'human dignity' but not rules, we have destroyed the basis
for judicial review."67 This and similar views are endorsed by a large
faction of today's American judiciary.68 Just two years ago, the United
65. AMERICANVALUES, supra note 11, at 6.
66. Foucha v. La., 504 U.S. 71, 99 (1992) (J. Kennedy dissenting) ("Incapacitation for
the protection of society is not an unusual ground for incarceration." (quoting Powell
v. Tex., 392 U.S. 514, 539 (1968) (Black, J., concurring))). See also Kan. v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 379-80 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Punishment serves several
purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventative. One of the reasons
society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future
harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment" (quoting
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 32 (2d ed. 1986))).
67. Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan, "Human Dignity," and Constitutional
Interpretation, in AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 11, at 130 n.2.
68. It is clear that even today Americans have still not fully embraced human
dignity as an explicit and core constitutional value. Leonard Levy's criticism of
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, Jr. is illustrative:
Brennan's humanistic activism runs amok and he evinces an
arrogance beyond belief.... He believed the ban on cruel and
unusual punishments embodies uniquely 'moral principles' that
prevent the state from inflicting the death penalty because it
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States Supreme Court in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista'9 explicitly
rejected the need for the state to respect an individual's human
dignity if doing so would be inconvenient to law enforcement.
In Atwater, a police officer stopped Gail Atwater when he
observed that her two children were not wearing seatbelts. Rather
than issuing a routine traffic citation, the officer yelled at Atwater
frightening her children, denied her the opportunity to leave her
children with a neighbor, handcuffed and arrested her, and placed her
in a jail cell for an hour before she was released on bond.70 Atwater
challenged the legality of her warrantless misdemeanor arrest as
violative of the Fourth Amendment's restriction on unreasonable
seizures. By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court found no
constitutional violation. The majority noted that "the physical
incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a
police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment"
and therefore "Atwater's claim to live free of pointless indignity and
confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against it
specific to her case."7' However, the Court went on to hold that the
arrest and mistreatment of Ms. Atwater, though individually
unreasonable, was nonetheless constitutionally permissible. v2 Thus,
even after acknowledging that the officer grossly violated Ms.
Atwater's dignity, the Court nonetheless found that the need to adopt
"clear and simple" police standards outweighed such violations. With
a much greater respect for human dignity, the German Constitutional
Court would not have reached this result.
irreversibly degrades 'the very essence of human dignity.' What
makes this humane opinion so arrogant is that Brennan knows that
the Fifth Amendment three times assumes the legitimacy of the
death penalty as does the Fourteenth Amendment (no denial of life
without due process). Moreover, he also understands that [the]
majority of his countrymen and his fellow Justices disagree with his
opinion ....
LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 372 (1988)
(emphasis added).
69. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
70. Id. at 368-69 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 346-47 (emphasis added).
72. See id. at 354. The Court reasoned, "we have traditionally recognized that a
responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring
sensitive case-by-case determinations of government need, lest every discretionary
judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review." Id. at
347.
73. See id.
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IV. AMERICAN ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE
When America's political goal of limiting governmental power is
coupled with its economic emphasis on freely operating markets, the
American notion of liberty becomes one where individuals are given
maximum ability to determine their own best interests which, when
added together, collectively determines the path of society. 4 This
notion of liberty is implicated in the leading United States Supreme
Court abortion decisions, Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.
A. Roe v. Wade75
Roe involved a Texas abortion law making it a crime to "procure
an abortion" except "by medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother."76  This law was similar to many other state
abortion laws that were in force at the time this case was decided.77 A
pregnant single woman named Jane Roe and a licensed physician, Dr.
Hallford, challenged the Texas statute. 7s Roe asserted that she was
unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life was not
threatened by her pregnancy. She therefore argued that the Texas
abortion statutes violated her right of personal privacy under the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.7 9 Dr.
Hallford asserted similar constitutional claims.' The District Court
declared the law unconstitutional under the Ninth Amendment,
making the statute void."' The United States Supreme Court granted
82
certiorari directly from the District Court.
74. See DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 6.
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. Id. at 117-18.
77. Id. at 116, 118 n.2.
78. Id. at 129. Other challengers dropped out due to lack of standing or non-
justiciability. Id.
79. Id. at 120.
80. Roe, 410 U.S. at 121.
81. Id. at 122. Specifically, the District Court held that
the 'fundamental right of single women and married persons to
choose where to have children is protected by the Ninth Amendment,
through the Fourteenth Amendment,' and that the Texas criminal
abortion statutes were void on their face because they were both
unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad infringement
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Before reaching the heart of its decision, the Supreme Court
carefully considered ancient attitudes on abortion;" the history of the
Hippocratic Oath;84 the common law, where abortion performed before
"quickening," the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero
usually occurring between the sixteenth and eighteenth weeks of
pregnancy, was not punishable as a crime;85 English statutory law;
86
early American state laws;" and the current positions of the American
Medical Association, the American Public Health Association, and the
American Bar Association. 8 Setting the stage for the adoption of its
trimester framework, the Court concluded from this evidence that
prior to the late nineteenth century, "a woman enjoyed a substantially
broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States
today. At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and very
possibly without such a limitation... ."89 The Court then went on to
examine the right to privacy and its effect on the abortion issue.
1. Right to Privacy as a Fundamental Right
According to the Supreme Court, a woman's right to choose
whether to have an abortion is grounded in the fundamental right to
privacy rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court admitted
that this right is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.
However, the Court noted that it has recognized this fundamental
right to privacy as far back as 1891, and that its decisions "make it
clear that only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this
83. Id. at 130.
84. Id. at 130-31.
85. Roe, 410 U.S. at 132. According to the Court, even abortion performed after
quickening was probably not considered a common law crime. Id. at 136.
86. Id. In 1803, the first English statute concerning abortion made abortion of a
quick fetus a capital crime but provided for lesser penalties for the felony of abortion
before quickening. Later English law abandoned the death penalty, but
characterized abortion as the destruction of 'the life of a child capable of being born
alive." Id.
87. Id. at 138-39 (explaining that most of the early state statutes dealt severely with
abortion after quickening but were lenient with it before quickening and provided
exceptions from punishment for abortions necessary to save the mother's life; by the
1950s, most state laws had abandoned the 'quickening' distinction; and by the early
1970s, about one-third of the states had lessened their restraints on abortion).
88. Id. at 141-47.
89. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140.
90. Id. at 152.
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guarantee of personal privacy."1 The Court then declared that under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the "right of privacy.., is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."92 The Court reasoned that a state's refusal to give the
pregnant woman this choice would be "detriment[al]" because
"[M]aternity... may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. 93
The Court recognized the countervailing state interests in
"protecting potential life" and in protecting the health of the mother.
Therefore, the Court rejected the claim that the woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy is absolute, and hence the Court felt that
some state regulation of the woman's right is appropriate.94 As such,
the Court declared that state laws restricting the woman's right to
choose are subject to strict scrutiny.95 Under strict scrutiny analysis,
a state may only restrict a woman's right to choose whether to have
an abortion if (1) the state has a "compelling interest" in restricting
abortion; and (2) the statute is narrowly tailored to fulfill that
interest.96
2. Trimester Approach
Justice Blackmun divided pregnancy into three trimesters and
adopted a different rule for each. During the first trimester, a state
may not ban, or even closely regulate, abortions. Instead, the
decision of whether to have an abortion is left entirely to the pregnant
woman and her physician.97 During the second trimester, the state
may protect its interest in the mother's health by regulating the
abortion procedure in ways that are "reasonably related" to her
91. Id.
92. Id. at 153. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The relevant text of the
Fourteenth Amendment reads, "[n]o [s]tate shall... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
94. Id. at 154. The Court noted that the right of privacy is not absolute when it
stated, "[t]he Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that
some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate." Id. at 153-54.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 155-56.
97. Id. at 163. The Court reasoned that because the mortality rate for mothers
having abortions during the first trimester is lower than the rate for full-term
pregnancies, the State has no valid (no compelling) interest in protecting the mother's
health by banning or closely regulating abortions during this period. Roe , 410 U.S.
at 163.
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health, such as requiring that an abortion take place in a hospital.98
During this period, the state may only regulate to protect its interest
in the mother's health, not its interest in the fetus's life. Finally, the
Court held that during the final trimester, the state may regulate or
even completely ban abortion because, according to the Court, at the
beginning of the third trimester the fetus becomes "viable," and after
viability, the state has a "compelling" interest in protecting the fetus.
However, abortion must still be permitted if necessary to protect the
life or health of the mother.99
B. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey00
The Supreme Court revisited the abortion issue almost twenty
years later in Casey. The Court reaffirmed the central holding of Roe
- that viability is the earliest point at which the state's interest in
fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a total legislative ban
on abortions not necessary to protect the life or health of the
mother.01 However, the Court abandoned Roe's trimester framework,
instead holding that before viability the state may not place an
"undue burden" on the woman's right to choose whether to have an
abortion. 12 The Court defined an "undue burden" as one that "has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."'0 3 Under this test, if
the State regulations merely "create a structural mechanism by which
the State... may express profound respect for the life of the unborn"
without unduly restricting the woman's right to choose, the
104
regulations will be upheld. Casey then held that after viability, the
state may proscribe all abortions not needed to protect the life or
health of the mother.105 The Casey Court noted that viability at the
98. Id.
99. Id. at 163-64.
100. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
101. Id. at 853, 860. The Court stated, "Roe is clearly in no jeopardy, since
subsequent constitutional developments have neither disturbed, nor do they threaten
to diminish, the scope of recognized protection accorded to the liberty relating to...
decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child." Id. at 857 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 873-74. The Court stated, "foinly where state regulation imposes an undue
burden on a woman's ability to make [the decision whether to abort] does the power of
the State reach into the heart of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at
874.
103. Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
104. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
105. Id. at 879.
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time of Roe was set at twenty-eight weeks, but by 1993, viability was
possible by as early as twenty-three weeks.
Even while arguably providing greater protection to the
developing fetus, °7 the Casey Court explicitly reemphasized the
woman's liberty interest in choosing whether to have an abortion.
According to the Court, the abortion decision should be left to the
woman alone. The Court reasoned,
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties,
to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear .... Her
suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our
culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large
extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her
place in society.'08
Further, the Court noted that individual liberty is at the heart of
its abortion jurisprudence, stating that
in some critical respects the abortion decision is of the same
character as the decision to use contraception, to which [other
cases] afford constitutional protection. We have no doubt as to the
correctness of those decisions. They support the reasoning in Roe
relating to the woman's liberty because they involve personal
decisions concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also
human responsibility and respect for it.109
In perhaps the most famous passage of Casey, the Court stated:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
106. Id. at 860.
107. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. The Court upheld the following
Pennsylvania laws: (1) an informed consent procedure mandating that, at least
twenty-four (24) hours before the abortion procedure, a physician must inform the
woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of both abortion and
childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the unborn child; (2) the requirement
that women under the age of eighteen (18) may not obtain an abortion without first
obtaining the informed consent of one of her parents; and (3) various reporting
requirements. All of these requirements would have probably been struck down
under Roe.
108. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
109. Id. at 852-53 (emphasis added).
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define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.
110
With its overwhelming emphasis on liberty, the Casey Court
ensured that a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy will continue to receive special constitutional protection.
V. GERMAN ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE
A. Abortion I..
Under the Abortion Reform Act of 1974, Germany granted
pregnant women the right to secure an abortion in the first twelve
weeks of pregnancy without facing criminal penalties. After twelve
weeks, abortion remained a punishable offense as under the old law,
with limited exceptions.112  In Abortion I, several members of the
German Federal Parliament challenged the Abortion Reform Act of
1974 as violative of Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law.
The Constitutional Court struck down the statute because it did
not adequately protect the life of the fetus."3 The Court first found
that Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1 of the Basic Law, declaring
that "le]veryone shall have the right to life," includes the life of the
developing fetus. The Court's recognition of the fetus as possessing
human dignity was a key step, as it obligated the state to protect the
fetus, even against the mother.115  However, the Court noted the
competing right of the woman to the free development of her
110. Id. at 851.
111. See BVerfGE 39, 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3,
at 336.
112. See Kommers, supra note 33, at 4. The statute still allowed an abortion when a
licensed physician determined that abortion was necessary to remove a clear danger
to the woman's life or health. The law before this Act declared that abortion was
always a punishable offense, except when necessary to remove a clear danger to the
pregnant woman's life or health.
113. See BVerfGE 39, 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3,
at 336-37.
114. See id. at 337. The Court declared that "[]ife in the sense of the developmental
existence of a human individual begins.., on the fourteenth day after conception
(implantation, individuation)." Id.
115. See id. at 338.
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personality, which also demands state protection."' The Court had to
balance these competing rights using its proportionality analysis.
The Court ultimately found that because human dignity is at the top
of the Basic Law's value system, "the decision must come down in
favor of. .. protecting the fetus's life over the right of self-
determination of the pregnant woman" for the duration of her
117
pregnancy.
The Abortion I Court's discussion of the woman's right to choose
whether to terminate her pregnancy is significant. The Court stated,
[It is true that] [piregnancy belongs to the intimate sphere of the
woman that is constitutionally protected ... [and] [iut is true that
the right of a woman freely to develop her personality also lays
claim to recognition and protection. [This right] includes freedom
of action in its comprehensive meaning and consequently also
embraces the woman's responsible decision against parenthood and
its attendant duties. But this right is not given without limitation
- the rights of others, the constitutional order, and moral law limit
it. [The right to personality] can never confer a priori the authority
to intrude upon the protected legal sphere of another without a
justifiable reason, much less the authority to destroy [this sphere]
as well as a life, especially because a special responsibility exists
precisely for this life. " 8
As seen in this passage, the Court clearly rejected the American
approach of granting priority to the woman's right to choose over and
above the need to protect the fetus.
In order to adequately protect the life of the developing fetus, the
Court found that because termination of pregnancy is an unlawful act
of killing, "[t]he use of criminal law to punish 'acts of abortion' is
undoubtedly legitimate," even against the pregnant woman."9
However, the Court later clarified that the legislature is not required
to use the criminal law in order to protect the life of the fetus if other
similarly effective measures are available. 12  The Court also noted
that in "extraordinary" situations such as where the life or health of
the pregnant woman is in jeopardy, the state may not subject the
116. See id. (stating "[ilt is true that the right of a woman freely to develop her
personality also lays claim to recognition and protection"). Id.
117. BVerfGE 39, 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at
339.
118. Id. at 338-39.
119. Id. at 340.
120. See id.
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woman to criminal sanctions.'"' The state, however, must provide
counseling and other forms of assistance to encourage the woman to
continue her pregnancy.
12 2
The Court found the Abortion Reform Act unconstitutional not
only because it did not adequately protect the life of the developing
fetus, but because it did not clearly condemn the act of abortion.
23
Stressing that "the legal order exists to instruct its citizens in the
moral content of the Basic Law," the Court mandated that the
legislature take steps to demonstrate a clear condemnation of
abortion, such as educating the public as to the illegality of taking the
life of a fetus.
1 4
B. Abortion 11125
After German reunification, Parliament enacted a new abortion
law in 1992 entitled the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act. Like
the statute at issue in Abortion I, under this new law, a woman could
secure an abortion in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy without
facing criminal penalties. For instance, abortion in the first twelve
weeks was actually deemed "not illegal." After the twelfth week of
pregnancy, the woman could only secure an abortion when necessary
to avert a serious threat to her life or to her mental or physical
health.126 Within one year, and within a year after Casey was decided,
the Constitutional Court struck down the law in Abortion II.
In Abortion II, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed that the state
has a duty to protect the life of the fetus at all points in the
pregnancy, and that the right to life generally holds priority over the
mother's constitutional rights. 27 The Court made clear, however, that
the right of the unborn to life is not absolute. 28 Thus, the Court held
that the state need not punish the illegal act if the abortion takes
121. See id. at 340-41.
122. See id. at 340 (stating, "[w]hat is determinative is whether the totality of those
measures serving to protect prenatal life.., in fact guarantee protection
commensurate with the importance of the legal interest to be safeguarded. . .
BVerfGE 39, 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 340.
123. See id. at 342.
124. Id. at 346.
125. BVerfGE 88, 203, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at
349.
126. See Kommers, supra note 33, at 13-14.
127. BVerfGE 88, 203, reprinted in CONSTITUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at
351.
128. Id.
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place in the first three months and the state has tried to persuade the
pregnant woman to change her mind. In the event of an "exceptional
situation," the woman need not carry the child to term.129 According
to the Court, an "exceptional situation" exists not only when the
mother's life or health is endangered, but also when a woman is asked
to sacrifice her own existential values to such an extent that one could
no longer expect her to go through with the pregnancy.130
Abortion 11 laid down specific duties the state must perform in
order to fulfill its general obligation to protect the life of the fetus.
First, the Court ordered the state to "take measures to confront
dangers threatening the present and future real-life relations of the
woman and her family."13' For example, the state must enact laws
designed to remedy the disadvantages to women in employment and
education that often results from pregnancy and childbirth. 132 Second,
the Court ruled that rather than employing the criminal law against a
pregnant woman who chooses to seek an abortion in the early stages
of pregnancy, the state should utilize counseling in order to convince
, 133
the woman to carry the child to term. In doing so, the Court
reemphasized the duty of the state to work together with the woman
in order to better protect the developing fetus. Third, the Court held
that the state may choose to impose criminal sanctions upon certain
third parties, including physicians who fail to ensure that the
pregnant woman has followed all required procedures prior to having
a legal abortion.13
VI. A COMPARISON OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND LIBERTY IN THE
AMERICAN AND GERMAN ABORTION DECISIONS
A. Greater Scope and Significance of Human Dignity in Germany as
Compared to Individual Liberty in America
The notion of human dignity in German jurisprudence is broader
and more significant than any analogous right in America. In
America, except in very limited circumstances, the Federal
129. See id. at 352.
130. See id. at 352-53.
131. Id. at 354.
132. See id.
133. See BVerfGE 88, 203, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3,
at 354-55.
134. See id. at 352.
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Constitution takes effect only when the government acts.135  In
Germany, on the other hand, constitutional rights affect both public
and private legal relationships."6  At its core, this difference
"demonstrates... how the American model of freedom posits private
liberty, whereas Germany envisions a public, social dimension to
freedom as well."
137
This feature of the German constitutional order is significant
because it both reveals and reinforces a stronger commitment to basic
fundamental freedoms than in America. In Germany, "[i]nsofar as
they are tangible radiations of human dignity, basic rights ... might
even be viewed as 'permanent ends of the state,' not changeable 'even
by constitutional amendment.'"13  However, in America all
fundamental rights are (theoretically at least) subject to
constitutional amendment.
B. Treatment of the Fetus Indicates Greater Respect for Human
Dignity in Germany
In the German abortion cases, the Constitutional Court
recognized the fetus as a living person from just the fourteenth day
after conception, 139 and therefore deserving of state protection
throughout the pregnancy. Most significantly, the Court in Abortion I
linked human life to human dignity - the Basic Law's supreme value.
The Court declared,
[wiherever human life exists, it merits human dignity; whether the
subject of this dignity is conscious of it and knows how to safeguard
it is not.., decisive .... The potential capabilities inherent in
135. DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 29.
136. Id. at 27. Rather than adopting either extreme of limiting Basic Law rights to
only public action (as in the United States) or of applying to any action, public or
private, the German Constitutional Court decided in Luth that the Basic Law should
apply "indirectly" to private law. This means that constitutional norms "influence"
rather than govern private law norms, which, for example, requires ordinary civil
courts to consider the Basic Law's objective system of values when interpreting civil
law rules. Id. at 29-30 (citing BVerfGE 7, 198, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 363 (the Basic Law influences the civil law, no civil
law provision may contradict the Basic Law, and all legal provisions must be
interpreted consistent with the Basic Law's spirit)).
137. DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 29.
138. Id. at 28.
139. See BVerfGE 39, 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3,
at 336.
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human existence from its inception are adequate to establish
human dignity.
140
Thus, according to the Court, while the pregnant woman's right
to personality also holds high rank in the hierarchy of basic rights, it
must give way when it conflicts with the fetus's right to life. In short,
unborn life is a constitutional value that the state must always
protect.
141
In stark contrast to the rhetoric in Germany, the United States
Supreme Court in Roe declared, "the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense." The Court
held the state does not have a "compelling" interest in protecting the
fetus until the beginning of the third trimester because it is not until
this point that the fetus is capable of living outside the mother's
womb.143  Subsequently, the Casey Court declared that only at
viability does the fetus enjoy even the potential for life outside the
mother's womb.144  Notably, the Supreme Court's use of the phrase
"potential life" in describing the fetus implies a lesser respect for the
dignity of the developing fetus than in Germany.
Moreover, in both Abortion I and Abortion II, the German
Constitutional Court clearly stated that abortion is fundamentally
wrong for the entire duration of the pregnancy. Thus, even though
abortion after conception may in some situations be "justifiable,"
German statutes must clearly state that abortion is always an illegal
and immoral act, and various private and public actors must convey
this message to the public.145 This explicit affirmation of the value of
the fetus clearly demonstrates a greater commitment to human
dignity in Germany than in the United States.
140. Id. at 338.
141. See Kommers, supra note 33, at 9, 16.
142. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913 (1992) (reaffirming the principle).
143. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
144. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860. Notably, as the Casey Court acknowledged, "advances in
neonatal care have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier." Id. Thus, the
actual viability line will probably continue to move to earlier stages in pregnancy.
See Webster v. Reprod. Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (holding that the state
may require the doctor of the pregnant woman to use sophisticated tests to determine
whether the particular fetus may possibly be viable, and then forbid the doctor from
performing the abortion if the tests indicate possible viability). Id.
145. See BVerfGE 88, 203, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
3, at 349, 352-53.
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C. Characterization of a Pregnant Woman's Rights Reveals a Broader
Commitment to Liberty in America
Not surprisingly, the commitment to liberty in the American
abortion cases is greater than in Germany's abortion cases. This is
highlighted by the fact that in the German and American abortion
cases, the courts are weighing significantly different women's rights.
The United States decisions are based on the general right to privacy
flowing from the constitutional guarantee of individual liberty, while
the German decisions are based on the woman's right to self-
determination. The American right to privacy is broader than the
German right to self-determination. The American right implies the
right to freedom from governmental interference ensuring the right to
privacy is given an almost absolute character, whereas the German
right guarantees the woman the right to develop her personality, but
this more specific right is subject to countervailing societal duties and
relationships.
146
By framing the woman's right in such broad terms, the United
States Supreme Court has arguably redefined the precise issue at
stake in the abortion debate - whether the woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy outweighs the fetus's right to survival. As
has been noted by previous commentators, the reliance on the broad
right to privacy in the United States is subject to several criticisms.
First, what the Supreme Court calls "privacy" is not how most people
understand the term. Instead, most people think of privacy as simple
freedom from official intrusion, such as freedom from official
surveillance under the Fourth Amendment. 147 Second, the Supreme
Court fails to explain why or how a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy falls back into the line of precedents the Court cited as
establishing the general right of privacy. The closest the Court comes
to justifying this link is by stating that "the right has some extension
to activities relating to marriage.",14  Finally, the
O'Connor/Kennedy/Souter plurality in Casey justified the recognition
of a "right" to an abortion, in part, on its characterization of abortion
as among a person's most basic decisions and involves "the most
146. See CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 314.
147. Roe, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated, "[n]or is the 'privacy' that the Court finds here even a distant relative of the
freedom from searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, which the Court has referred to as embodying a right to privacy." Id.
148. Id. at 152.
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intimate and personal [choice] . 149 However, this rationale could be
applied equally to polygamy, adult incest, and suicide; all of which can
constitutionally be proscribed.150
VII. CONCLUSION: THE INTERPLAY OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVERGENCE
This article has compared Germany's emphasis on human dignity
with America's reliance on individual liberty in each country's leading
abortion cases. The abortion cases are an excellent vehicle for this
comparison because the abortion debate boils down to a moral
dilemma between preserving the sanctity of life on the one hand and
the freedom of choice on the other. 1 The particular balance struck in
each country between individual liberty and human dignity makes
sense in light of the events immediately preceding the drafting of each
nation's constitution. The American decision to base its government
on maximizing individual liberty and limiting state power was a
direct response to the oppressive English political system.
Conversely, Germany's choice to place the affirmative state duty to
respect human dignity at the top of its value structure was
undoubtedly a reaction to Nazi Germany's total disregard for the
sanctity of human life.
With each country's constitution fueling the analysis, Germany's
high court ultimately determined that the unborn child's human
dignity and resulting right to life generally trumps the competing
rights of the pregnant woman. However, in America's abortion cases,
the Supreme Court ruled that the woman's liberty interest
predominates over the fetus's potential life. Yet, in all four of these
decisions, both nations clearly recognized the need to respect and
balance both individual liberty and human dignity. Accordingly, both
courts explicitly declared that the dominant right was not absolute.
In Roe, the United States Supreme Court rejected the claim that the
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is absolute, and thus found
some state regulation of abortion appropriate. 152  Meanwhile, in
Abortion II, the Constitutional Court declared that the fetus's right to
149. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849, 851.
150. See id. at 984 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 162, 165.
152. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54 (stating, "[tihe Court's decisions recognizing a right of
privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right
is appropriate"). Id.
[Vol. 11:2
2004] HUMAN DIGNITY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
life holds priority over the mother's constitutional rights.
Nevertheless, the Court found that the right of the unborn to life is
not absolute. Thus, the Court made abortion in the first three months
of pregnancy non-punishable as long as the state was given an
opportunity to persuade the pregnant woman to change her mind.
5 4
As seen in the subtle changes in each country's abortion
jurisprudence, there are strong indications that the relative weights
given to the competing claims of individual liberty and human dignity
in each country are converging. In the United States, the change
from Roe's trimester approach to Casey's undue burden standard
indicates a shift toward providing greater protection to the fetus at
the expense of the mother's right of privacy. After Casey, only
regulations placing an "undue burden" on a woman's ability to choose
whether to abort are unconstitutional. This rule holds true only prior
to viability. Significantly, the Casey Court did not apply strict
scrutiny as the Court had done in Roe. Rather, it applied the less
restrictive "undue burden" standard, revealing that the decision
whether to have an abortion is perhaps no longer a "fundamental
right," and that perhaps future restrictions will continue to receive
something less than strict scrutiny.
Finally, by marking viability as the watermark, Casey ensured
greater protection to the developing fetus, as advances in medical
technology should continue to push back the point at which a fetus
becomes viable to earlier points in the pregnancy.'55 All of this adds
up to an increasing protection of the fetus at the expense of the
woman's liberty interest in deciding whether to carry her child to
term.
As the American high court has moved toward the middle of the
human dignity-individual liberty continuum, we also see the German
high court moving its country toward the middle by mandating a
greater respect for the woman's right to choose. After Abortion I, a
pregnant woman wanting an abortion in the first twelve weeks had to
convince her counselors that her social predicament was "severe."
However, the woman no longer has this burden after Abortion I.
Today, although counseling is required in order to convey a strong
153. See BVerfGE 88, 203, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
3, at 349.
154. Id. at 352; see also Kommers, supra note 33, at 17.
155. See Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (indicating the state may require the doctor to
determine through sophisticated tests whether the particular fetus may possibly be
viable, and then forbid the doctor from performing the abortion if the tests indicate
possible viability).
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pro-life message, the ultimate decision of whether to have an abortion
rests in the hands of the woman.
With the two countries taking opposite starting points along the
human dignity-individual liberty continuum, it is doubtful a full
convergence will take place anytime soon. In future abortion cases,
the German Constitutional Court will most likely begin where it left
off in Abortion II by stating that, as a general matter, abortion is an
illegal act of killing. Notably, the German Court has less leeway than
the United States Supreme Court to change the liberty-dignity
balance because the Basic Law does not allow for any action that
would offend the principle of human dignity. The Basic Law even
prohibits a constitutional amendment, thus solidifying human dignity
as the highest value in the German Constitution.157 Conversely, the
United States Supreme Court ensured in Casey that a woman's right
to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy will continue to receive
special constitutional protection by stressing that the abortion
decision should be left to the woman alone.
In conclusion, America clings to liberty above all other
constitutional values. The image of the human person in American
constitutional law remains that of an autonomous individual
somewhat separate from the community. On the other hand,
Germany remains committed to a strong communitarian orientation
and a profound respect for human dignity. Thus, it remains doubtful
that the two countries will meet in the middle as long as they
continue down their respective paths.
156. See BVerfGE 88, 203, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
3, at 349.
157. Kommers, supra note 33, at 11.
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